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Abstract 
In this study, we consider whether the market conditions its reactions to a senior 
executive’s (SE) move from an origin company (OC) to a destination company (DC) on 
the SE’s past performance and any other information impounded in the market reaction to 
the SE’s emigration from the OC. We also examine whether the market perceives a 
benefit in the hiring of an SE with an industry-specific background.  We find that, with 
regard to migration events, the performance of the OC—accounting and stock—before 
the SE’s migration is positively associated with the market reaction to the immigration 
event only when the OC and the DC are members of the same industry. With respect to 
an OC’s contiguously subsequent write-off and restructuring events, we conjecture that 
subsequent large restructuring events signal hitherto unrecognized shortcomings of the 
emigrating SE, whereas non-restructuring asset write-offs are more likely to be a 
manifestation of neutral (with respect to inferences regarding the quality of the 
emigrating SE) big baths taken by the OC’s incoming SE. We hypothesize and find that, 
ceteris paribus, the market reaction to the DC’s stock at the time of the OC’s 
announcement of a post-immigration write-off or restructuring is negatively associated 
with the OC’s pre-emigration performance (which is predominantly positive in our 
sample), and possibly non-negatively associated with an asset write-off (which is not a 
restructuring event). We also conjecture that these effects are enhanced (become more 
negative) when the DC imports an SE from a competitor.  
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Information Transfer Effects of Senior Executives’ 
Migrations and Subsequent Write-offs 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Senior executive (SE) turnover is a significant event. It is rich in implications for 
both the company from which the SE emigrates (the origin company, henceforth OC) and 
the company into which he immigrates (the destination company, henceforth DC). The 
event transmits strong, but often ambivalent, signals to the capital markets about both the 
OC and the DC. First consider the OC. Is the SE’s emigration a foreboding of adverse 
news yet tocome or a promise of improved future prospects once the poorly performing 
SE is replaced? Does it portend trouble if a skillful and able SE has been drawn away by 
another company—or, worse yet, by a competitor?  
 
For the DC, the implications are no less ambiguous. The hiring of an SE with a 
past record of inept performance would not sit well with the market, but attracting a 
proficient SE who previously inhabited the executive suite of a competitor would delight 
stakeholders, rewarding the DC with a positive stock returns. What, too, of the asset 
write-offs or other charges that seem disproportionately to accompany SE migrations?  
Do such charges convey different signals than those taken at other times? Do the signals 
transmitted by the magnitude of charges carry over to the DC that hired the departing SE? 
 
In this study, we consider whether the market conditions its reactions to the SE’s 
move to the DC on the SE’s past performance and any other information impounded in 
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the market reaction to the SE’s emigration from the OC. We also examine whether the 
market perceives a benefit in the hiring of an SE with an industry-specific background.   
We investigate whether the market updates its initial perceptions of the SE’s quality 
when the OC announces unusual charges, and whether the charges signal good or bad 
news for the OC and the DC. That is, we examine whether the market conditions its 
reaction to the SE’s emigration and contiguously subsequent charges on available 
information, such as the departing SE’s past performance as reflected in accounting or 
market returns.  
 
We focus on the migration of the SE from one firm to another.  Although prior 
research has tracked SEs who emigrate from a given firm, typically viewing such events 
as raids, the focus was on the market valuation of their quality (Hayes and Schaefer, 
1999), the effects of prior performance on the probability of a “jump,” and the association 
between performance and compensation (Fee and Hadlock, 2003). We do replicate some 
of these findings, but we extend the analysis to investigating the market reaction to write-
offs made shortly after a migration.  The migration event and contiguously subsequent 
charge-offs affect both the OC and the DC. Thus, the migration affords a good 
opportunity to study information transfer within a paired companies setting.  
 
We conduct a set of univariate tests addressing the above questions.  We 
investigate and find the following: 
 
1. Generally consistent with Fee and Hadlock (2003), we find that both OCs and 
DCs exhibit accounting profitability measures that are superior to (in line with) industry 
peers (size-matched industry peers) over at least two years preceding the emigration from 
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OCs and immigration into DCs. Although in negative territory in the year preceding 
immigration, OCs’ stock performance on average exceeds (is in line with) industry peers 
(size-matched industry peers), whereas DCs' stocks underperform both industry peers and 
size-matched industry peers. 
 
2. For at least two years after migration, both OCs and DCs outperform peers and 
size-matched peers in both stock and accounting performance measures, implying that 
management change is ex post beneficial, on average. 
 
3. The market appears to recognize the loss (gain) of human capital from OCs (DCs) 
upon emigration (immigration). Consistent with Hayes and Shaefer (1999), but using 
different methods for extracting abnormal returns, we find that size-adjusted returns of 
OCs (DCs) are significantly negative (positive) and below (above) those of industry peers 
and of those observed upon retirement events.  The market “remembers.” Moreover, we 
find that the positive reaction to immigration is more pronounced when SEs emigrate 
from an industry peer.  The market seems to value industry-specific human capital. 
 
4. The market also appears to process the information implied in the reaction to 
emigration to inform its interpretation of the immigration event.  Consistent with Hayes 
and Shaefer (1999), we find that the correlation between the two reactions is significantly 
negative.  
 
5. Migration firms report more frequent negative special items (mostly write-offs 
and restructuring charges), extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and accounting 
changes than their size-matched peers.  This is consistent with restructuring implemented 
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by new leadership to rectify what they perceive to be unsound business judgment by 
predecessors, or "big baths" to boost future apparent performance. 
 
6. Write-offs following migrations carry different implications than write-offs by 
non-migration firms.  For both OCs and DCs, the market reaction is strongly negative, 
and significantly more negative than in the case of size-matched non-migration peers.  
Thus, history (the prior migration event) shapes interpretations. 
 
7. In general, the market reaction to the DC's stock is negative and significant upon 
an OC’s write-offs when the SE migrates from an OC in a different industry, but positive 
and marginally significant when the SE migrates from an OC in the same industry.  
Similarly, the reaction with regard to the OC's stock upon a DC's write-off is significantly 
positive when the OC and DC are in the same industry, but insignificant when they are 
not.  The market behaves as if it recognizes potential competitive advantages (gains in 
market share) inuring to the benefit of a DC from the adversity faced by a same-industry 
OC.   
 
8. In line with prior literature, non-restructuring write-offs trigger a more negative 
reaction than restructuring write-offs.  Interestingly, however, this finding is reversed 
when we focus on cross-firm information transfers: the reaction with regard to the DC's 
stock upon the OC's non-restructuring write-off is positive.  This is consistent with the 
market appreciating the potential benefits from restructuring in the OC, but adjusting 
downward its estimate of the value to the DC of the SE implicated by the post-emigration 
restructuring.  Thus, the same accounting events have different implications for different 
audiences. 
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In the more nuanced multivariate analysis, we test and largely confirm two main 
hypotheses. With regard to migration events, the performance of the OC—accounting 
and stock—before the SE’s migration is positively associated with the market reaction to 
the event only when the OC and the DC are members of the same industry. With respect 
to an OC’s contiguously subsequent write-off and restructuring events, we conjecture that 
subsequent large restructuring events signal hitherto unrecognized shortcomings of the 
emigrating SE, whereas non-restructuring asset write-offs are more likely to be a 
manifestation of neutral (with respect to inferences regarding the quality of the 
emigrating SE) big baths taken by the OC’s incoming SE. We hypothesize that, ceteris 
paribus, the market reaction with regard to the DC’s stock at the time of the OC’s 
announcement of a post-immigration write-off or restructuring is negatively associated 
with the OC’s pre-emigration performance (which is predominantly positive in our 
sample), and possibly non-negatively associated with an asset write-off (which is not a 
restructuring event). We also conjecture that these effects are enhanced (become more 
negative) when the DC imports an SE from a competitor.  
 
Senior executives leave firms for several reasons: (a) retirement due to age, where 
the announcement refers to a succession plan; (b) resignation, where the announcement 
does not refer to a succession plan—this is typically associated with poor past 
performance, and some of the SEs revert to the managerial market pool; and (c) voluntary 
exit of mostly younger, sought-after SEs, who end up being hired by other companies.  
 
When SEs retire, the successor is typically chosen in advance to minimize 
disruption. In the case of performance-related resignations, with very few exceptions, the 
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firm’s announcement refrains from blaming the performance. Some of these resigning 
SEs could re-enter the managerial market pool and thus move to other companies. This 
circumstance typically applies to SEs whose OCs’ performance was buffeted by adverse 
events mostly outside their control but who are perceived to be competent SEs by talent-
scouting DCs. SEs stigmatized by exceptionally poor performance usually fail to land a 
similarly ranked job after resignation (Gilson, 1989). Thus, case (b) can be subdivided: 
(b1) resigning SEs who do not move to similarly ranked jobs, and (b2) resigning SEs who 
move to similarly ranked jobs. Figure 1 below illustrates these classifications. In case (c), 
mostly managers voluntarily choose to emigrate from the OC for better compensation or 
opportunity. Often, the DCs hire key personnel from successful competitors. 
 
Figure 1. Description of Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our investigation concentrates on cases (b2) and (c). We identify a sample of 
emigrating SEs who land similar or better ranked jobs,1 the OCs from which they 
Case a Case c
Retirements
Voluntary
Departures
b1 b2
Do not
immigrate to
similarly
ranked jobs
Immigrate
to similarly
ranked jobs
Case b
Resignations
 
Our sample 
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emigrated, and the DCs to which they migrated. Although prior work primarily has 
sought to identify the reasons for the SE’s exit (see Brickley, 2003, for a short summary 
of conclusions), our emphasis, similar to Hayes and Schaefer (1999), is on the market 
reactions to emigration and immigration events of a given SE and whether these reactions 
are systematically related, i.e., whether the market conditions its reaction to the 
immigration of a given SE on the information revealed by the prior emigration event; and 
(2) the market reaction to the OC’s write-off events that contiguously follow the 
immigration event and the information transfer effect of these events on the stock of the 
DC that imported the SE.  
 
Prior research has documented the effects of past performance on migration and 
compensation (Fee and Hadlock 2003) and the market effect of emigration and 
immigration (Hayes and Schaefer 1999), and we refine these findings, distinguishing 
between inter-industry and intra-industry migrations, and use them in an extended 
analysis. We investigate whether migrations seem to trigger a disproportionate number of 
write-off events, the effects of which vary depending on history or context and on the 
entity whose stock is being examined.  In doing so, we also trace how inferences of the 
SE’s quality as manifested in past performance and the market’s reaction to emigration 
informs and updates the market’s assessment of the implication of the write-offs for the 
prospects of the DC importer. These explorations offer new insights into the effects of SE 
migration and subsequent events on capital markets.  
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The rest of the paper features the following sections: Literature review, 
Development of Hypothesis, Sample and descriptive statistics, Univariate tests, Results, 
and Conclusion. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Prior literature has focused on the determinants of the management change; 
evidence of earnings management before or after the change using discretionary accruals, 
divestitures and write-offs, etc.; and the market’s reaction to the change.   
 
2.1. Determinants of the management change 
 
Determinants of management change include poor performance, outside board 
intervention, and the competitiveness of the management market. Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985) and Warner et al. (1988) were among the first to show the link between poor stock 
performance and management change. Weisbach (1988) found the association between 
past stock returns and change in EBIT with management change to be more pronounced 
when BODs were outsider-dominated, but found no support for a management 
entrenchment effect on turnover (Morck et al. (1988)), although Denis et al. (1997) were 
able to detect evidence of such an effect. 
 
Parrino (1997) conjectured and found that poorly performing companies can more 
easily find replacements for their departing managers in competitive industries wherein 
the management pool is large. Gilson (1989) showed that managers who left financially 
distressed firms2 were not able to find equivalent jobs in other companies, surmising that 
managers of the worst performing firms suffer from damaged reputation.  
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2.2. Evidence of earnings management around the management change 
 
Using a sample of 36 top management changes for the period 1966 to 1969, 
Moore (1973) showed that after experiencing management change companies tend to 
take more income-decreasing accounting actions, such as write-offs, write-downs, 
provisions for future losses, and changes in accounting principles. Pourciau (1993), using 
a sample of 73 non-routine management changes, found that incoming executives employ 
income-decreasing accruals such as special items or write-offs to boost future 
profitability. Strong and Meyer (1987) documented higher incidence of internal and 
external management changes among 120 write-down firms during 1981-1985 than in 
non-write-down firms, but did not indicate whether departing or incoming managers 
initiated the write-downs. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) examined 1,063 CEO 
departures and, controlling for the endogeneity of CEO turnover, found changes in 
discretionary financial measures 3  to be associated with poor accounting and stock 
performance, implying that the outgoing CEO chooses more income-increasing 
discretionary accounting choices before his departure, even after controlling for the 
CEO’s horizon. Weisbach (1995) found incoming management to be more likely to make 
divestiture decisions than management in firms with no change, in particular when the 
investments made by prior management proved to be unsuccessful, ex post.  
 
2.3. Stock reaction to management change and write-offs 
 
In Warner et al. (1988), the stock reaction to the management change was 
insignificant, but their sample of 279 firms in the 1963-1978 period included both routine 
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and non-routine management changes,4 and cases in which managers were scouted from 
the outside. In particular, the stock reaction of the manager-importing firms (46) was 
significantly positive.  In Weisbach (1988), the stock reaction at the resignation 
announcement was mostly positive (-0.09% to 1.25%) but insignificant, regardless of the 
board type (inside, outside, or mixed). Hayes and Schaefer (1999) showed that top CEOs 
immigrating into raiding firms trigger a negative (positive) reaction with regard to the 
raided (raiding) firm.  
 
Without distinguishing between firms with respect to management change, Strong 
and Meyer (1987) found that the stock reaction is not significant over the two months 
ending in the write-off announcement. Elliott and Shaw (1988) also found no significant 
short-window stock reaction to the write-off announcement. Bartov et al. (1998), 
however, observed a relatively small negative stock reaction (less than 1%) and showed 
that the market acted as if it had anticipated the write-off, as the returns preceding the 
write-offs were significantly negative. Upon distinguishing between asset write-offs and 
restructurings, Bartov et al. (1998) also found the reaction to the former to be 
significantly negative (-2.14%), and the latter to be an insignificant (0.85%). 
 
2.4 Studies related to migrations 
 
Hayes and Schaefer (1999), using a sample of 158 CEO migrations during 1979–
1994, investigated whether the market reaction to migration is significant. Theory (Harris 
and Holmstrom, 1982; Lazear, 1986) suggests that emigrating SEs are likely to possess 
higher managerial ability.5 Thus, they hypothesized and confirmed that the reaction to the 
emigration (immigration) at the OC (DC) is negative (positive).  
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Fee and Hadlock (2003) found that better pre-emigration stock performance of the 
OC increases the probability of migration and compensation at the raiding company, and 
that stock options and restricted stock (golden handcuffs) do not affect the probability of 
retention.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003), in a manager-firm matched panel data set, found 
that considerable heterogeneity in investment, financial, and managerial practices of 
firms can be explained by managers’ style (manager fixed effects.)  
 
In terms of sample and some of the research questions, Hayes and Schaefer 
(1999) and Fee and Hadlock (2003) are closely related to our study.  Hayes and 
Schaeffer’s sample comprised 158 migrations during 1974–1999 (29 CEO-to-CEO and 
129 non-CEO-to-CEO migrations identified from Lexis/Nexis Executive Changes and 
News databases), thus restricting their observations to CEO immigrations. Fee and 
Hadlock (2003) employed two sample-gathering strategies. In the first, using a fixed 
sample of large firms in 1990–1998, they identified 214 migrations among 1,200 CEO 
turnovers. In the second, among the executives listed in EXECOMP whose employer was 
a constituent of the S&P 500 index, they identified 128 SE migrations. Their second 
sample was chosen to make it possible to identify the impact of stock options and 
restricted stock on retention. In our study, we follow Fee and Hadlock’s (2003) second 
strategy, albeit without requiring that the SE be employed by a S&P 500 constituent, or 
that he occupy the CEO position in the DC.  We do however impose the additional 
requirements that the migrating SE have been employed by the OC for more than 3 years 
before emigration and by the DC for 1½ years following the immigration. We also 
exclude migrations in which the SE immigrated into an OC that lost its SE to the DC, 
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thus avoiding overlapping OCs and DCs.  On the other hand, we include OCs that 
merged or were acquired by another firm within a year before the emigration.  
 
Hayes and Schaefer (1999) found that the stock reaction to the emigration 
(immigration) is negative (positive) and that the stock reactions to the emigrations and to 
the immigrations are negatively correlated. Our findings are similar. Fee and Hadlock 
(2003) found that the pre-emigration performance of OCs is positive. Our results do not 
show positive pre-emigration performance in terms of 2-year size-adjusted returns, but 
the 2-year size and industry-adjusted returns are positive. 
 
In addition to these questions, however, we address distinctively different issues:  
whether the stock reaction to the immigration is explained not only by the stock reaction 
to the emigration, but also by the pre-emigration stock and accounting performance. We 
focus as well on the subsequent write-offs taken by the OC, and examine whether market 
reactions are consistent with investors’ revising their beliefs about the SE’s quality at the 
time of immigration, depending on prior performance and on the market reaction to the 
emigration. Also, with respect to all these issues, we distinguish between same-industry 
migrations and other-industry migrations. 
 
III. Hypotheses and Research Design 
In this section, we develop and provide motivation for the main hypotheses. We then 
describe the sample, the results of univariate tests, and finally the results of the multiple 
regression models that test the main hypotheses. 
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3.1. The migration hypothesis 
The market reaction to an SE’s migration is a function of the SE’s perceived 
quality. A DC can glean information about this quality from the OC’s pre-emigration 
accounting performance measures, but it can also infer from the market reaction to 
emigration whatever private information about the SE’s quality was possessed by 
informed traders. The two sources of information, the OC’s past performance (returns 
and accounting measures) and the OC’s market reaction are confounded by distinct sets 
of events. Past returns and accounting measures also reflect events outside the SE’s 
control, rendering them noisy signals of managerial quality, whereas private information 
embedded in the market reaction to the emigration may also include an assessment of the 
quality of the SE’s replacement, often announced contemporaneously with the migration. 
Both sources therefore offer complementary bits of intelligence. If one focuses on OCs 
and DCs that share industry membership, signals such as accounting and stock 
performances are likely more relevant than they are in the sample consisting of 
migrations across firms in different industries. Correspondingly, private signals 
embedded in the market reaction to the emigration are likely to be less important in the 
same-industry sample of OCs and DCs. Hence we hypothesize: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the DC’s market reaction at the migration event is 
(a) positively associated with pre-emigration accounting and stock performance measures 
and   
(b) negatively associated with the OC’s market reaction at the emigration event.  
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(c) The associations involving past performance measures are predicted to be more 
pronounced when the SE emigrates from an OC within the DC’s own industry.  
 
3.1.1. Discussion 
 
We use the following notation for stock returns. (Precise measurement is provided 
in section 3.1.1.3.) 
Emigration(-1,1)
OC
CAAR  is the cumulative average abnormal return of the OC around the SE’s 
emigration measured over the (-1,1) window. 
Immigration(-1,1)
DC
CAAR  is the cumulative average abnormal return of the DC around the SE’s 
immigration measured over the (-1,1) window. 
 
3.1.1.1. Past performance as a proxy for the SE’s quality 
One may learn about an SE’s quality from publicly available information such as 
stock and accounting performance (both affect the SE’s compensation). Yet although a 
company’s stock performance is readily comparable with that of peers (size-matched 
same-industry firms), it may not be entirely attributable to the actions of the emigrating 
SE; firm-specific events outside the SE’s control affect stock prices, even after we control 
for market and industry returns. Hence, accounting performance measures may provide 
incrementally informative signals of managerial quality, as they are likely to more closely 
reflect events and actions that are within the SE’s control. Consequently, we employ both 
measures as proxies for the SE’s quality. H1a states that quality inferred from these 
measures is expected to be associated with the market’s reaction to the DC’s hiring the 
SE.  However, we expect the market to find accounting measures more informative about 
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the quality of SEs that DCs imported from OCs in the same industry, since accounting 
practices tend to be industry-specific.  
 
3.1.1.2. The market reaction to emigration 
At emigration, the market reacts to two events: the departure of the SE and any 
contemporaneous replacement announcement. The stock reaction 
Emigration(-1,1)
OC
CAAR reflects jointly the quality of the emigrating SE and that of the 
replacement. The replacement announcement confounds the analysis. Irrespective of the 
perceived quality of the replacement, if any, a positive (negative) market reaction would 
reflect a poor (good) quality of the emigrating SE.  
 
Investors also acquire private information about SEs’ quality; financial analysts 
routinely track SEs’ performance, actions, strategies, and past careers. Thus prices 
impound this private information as well. We expect the abnormal reaction to emigration 
( Emigration(-1,1)OCCAAR ) to provide an incremental signal on the emigrating SE’s quality.6 We 
therefore hypothesize that the market learns about the quality of a migrating SE by 
observing Emigration(-1,1)OCCAAR . In other words, we expect the abnormal reaction to 
immigration ( Immigration(-1,1)DCCAAR ) to be negatively associated with Emigration(-1,1)OCCAAR .  
In contrast, due to sample construction, Immigration(-1,1)DCCAAR  is not confounded by the 
perceived quality of the departing SE: the DC position will have been vacant for awhile 
(at least a year) due to natural causes (such as death), newly created positions, or a 
normal succession policy under which predecessors continue to serve as active managers 
in senior positions.  
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3.1.1.3. Competitive relationship—industry-specific knowledge, H1c 
An important factor that DCs consider when hiring SEs is industry-specific 
human capital. An SE in possession of firm-specific experience and knowledge gained 
while in the employ of a competitor OC contributes a valuable intangible asset to the 
DC.7 At the event of immigration, we expect the market properly to perceive the 
advantage to be gained by importing the SE from an OC within the same industry. Hence 
we expect the association discussed above to be manifested more strongly when OCs and 
DCs are members of the same industry, and particularly so when accounting past 
performance measures are involved for the reasons mentioned above.  
We run the following regression: 
Immigration( 1,1) 1 2
3 4
( 1,1)5 6 7 ( 1,1)
DC OC
OC OC
OCOC OC
Emigration Emigration
CAAR SameIndustry AcctPerf
SameIndustry Acctperf StockPerf
SameIndustry StockPerf SameIndustry CAARCAAR
! " "
" "
" " "
#
# #
= + +
+ $ +
+ $ + + $
,  
where Immigration(!1,1)DCCAAR 8 = the DC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns during the 
short window (-1,1) around immigration; 
 
SameIndustry= 1 if the two-digit SIC code of the DC and the OC are the same, zero 
otherwise; 
OCAcctPerf  = the industry-adjusted two-year ROE, ROE = (EBIT1 + EBIT2)/ Average 
(Equity0, Equity2 ),9 where the industry-adjusted ROE = ROE – Average of ROE in the 
same (two-digit SIC) industry; 
OCStockPerf  = the OC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns over the two years of 
the SE’s tenure preceding emigration (see Figure 2 for a timeline); 
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Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  = the OC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns during the short 
window (-1, 1) around emigration.10  
We expect the following: β2 > 0 , β4 > 0 (Η1a) , β6<0 (Η1b), β3>0, β5>0 , β7<0  and 
β2+β3>0, β4+β5>0 , β6+β7<0 (Η1c).  
 
3.2 Hypothesis on the OC’s Write-Off  
H2: Ceteris paribus, when the OC and the DC are in the same industry and the write-off 
is a part of restructuring,  
a. the past performance of the OC is negatively associated with the DC’s market 
reaction upon the OC’s write-off, and 
b. the effect of the OC’s write-off becomes increasingly negative with the amount of 
restructuring.  
 
The DC’s market reaction to the OC’s write-off announcement likely depends on the 
past performance of the OC from which the SE emigrated, the causes for the write-off, 
and the amount of charges, as well as on whether the OC is a member of the DC’s 
industry.  
 
We consider two factors—the OC’s past performance and the amount of the 
charges—that likely affect the market’s reaction.  The predicted associations depend on 
two conditioning variables—whether the OC and the DC are in the same industry and 
whether the OC’s write-off is part of a restructuring announcement. Unlike the 
immigration event where the positive past performances of the OC is associated with 
positive market reaction to the immigration, it is expected to be negatively associated 
with DC’s reaction to the write-off.  
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3.2.1. Discussion 
The OC’s write-off decision may signal that the apparent good past performance 
of the emigrating SE was misleading. The judgment that the SE was of high quality, 
given past good performance measures, may have been premature. Consequently, the 
market reassesses the SE’s quality. We have two measures of past performance, 
accounting and stock returns, as well as the private signals embedded in the market 
reaction to emigration. Accounting and stock performance are more easily manipulated 
by the migrating SE, and hence the investor views them with suspicion. The SE cannot 
control the private signals embedded in Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR .  Hence, we expect the market 
reaction to the DC’s stock upon the OC’s write-off to have a negative association with 
past performance measures, and especially accounting-based measures, which are 
probably more easily manipulable than stock returns. 
 
The write-off-induced revision is likely to be more negative, the more positive the 
past performance proxies, but this only holds if the DC’s investors deem the past 
accounting performance relevant to the future profitability of the DC.  Indeed, the test of 
H1 confirms this: accounting performance is relevant in same-industry migrations; 
Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  is relevant in different-industry migrations.   It is moreover reasonable 
to assume that doubts on the implications of past performance increase when the OC’s 
write-off is part of a restructuring plan.  Restructuring11 can betray past mismanagement 
manifested in continuing the operation of losing lines of business. Even so, it is still 
possible that a non-restructuring write-off has negative implications for the quality of the 
SE. This effect could be mitigated, however, when a “big bath” is suspected. If the write-
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off is seen as a “big bath” that the newly appointed SE takes merely to engender apparent 
future improvements in accounting performance, the announcement will be devoid of 
negative information on the quality of the migrating SE. In fact, given the high frequency 
of write-offs in firms whose SEs emigrate, the market could anticipate a restructuring 
announcement by the OC. Non-restructuring write-off announcements may bring a sigh 
of relief to the DC’s investors, possibly resulting in a positive reaction to the DC’s stock. 
 
The above associations may differ if the OC and DC are in the same industry.  
The write-off could be seen as implying a competitive advantage for the DC, somewhat 
offsetting the otherwise anticipated negative reaction. Generally, we expect a negative 
market reaction to the DC to become increasingly negative with the amount of 
restructuring when the OC and the DC are in the same industry.  
 
An additional factor possibly affecting the DC’s market reaction is whether 
charges are reported but no amount is specified. This can render the assessment of the 
SE’s quality more uncertain. In our sample, all of the write-offs with no specified amount 
were part of restructuring announcements. We predict that such non-quantified write-off 
announcements will have a negative impact on the DC’s market reaction to the OC’s 
write-off, and that this negative impact will be larger for a migration within the same 
industry. 
 
 
We estimate the following model:12  
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where OCW /O(!1,1)DCCAAR  is the DC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns over the 
short window (-1,1) around the OC’s write-off; 
SameIndustry = 1 if the two-digit SIC codes of the DC and the OC are the same, zero 
otherwise; 
AcctPerfOC = (EBIT1 + EBIT2)/ Average (Equity0, Equity2); 
StockPerfOC is the OC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns over the preceding two 
years of the SE’s tenure (from two years and two days before emigration to one day 
before emigration);  
Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  = the OC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns during the short 
window (-1, 1) around emigration; 
Restructuring = 1 if the OC’s charge is part of a restructuring plan, zero otherwise; and 
Amount = Charge/Total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
No-Amount = 1 if the announcement of OC’s write-off does not specify the amount, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Based on our discussion, we expect the following:  
β3+β4+β5 Negative, H2a 
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β10+β11+β12 Negative. H2b 
β13+β14 Negative 
 
IV. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1. Construction of sample 
The SE migration sample is constructed to include all migrations of SEs from 
CFO or COO positions in OCs to CFO, COO or CEO positions in DCs, and from CEO 
positions in OCs to CEO positions in DCs. To minimize overlap between OCs and DCs, 
the latter are confined to firms that hired the SE due to natural causes.13 This ensures that 
the market reaction to the immigration event is not confounded by news about an 
emigrating SE.  
 
Figure 2 presents the timeline underlying the research design.  
Generally, OCs announce the resignation simultaneously with the replacement 
decision, so the reaction to the OC’s emigration event is jointly attributable to the 
perceived quality of the emigrating SE and to the perceived quality of his replacement. In 
most of the cases in our sample, the vacant position in the OC is filled internally (92%). 
The frequency of CEOs migrating to CEO positions is low.  
 
We constructed the initial sample from the Standards and Poor’s EXECOMP, 
which begins its coverage in 1994. Thus, our sample period spans 1994-2002. CEOs and 
CFOs shown as occupying their positions at different firms for any two consecutive years 
were initially assigned to the SE migration sample. For this initial sample, we reviewed 
all the financial media covered by the Dow Jones News Service (now Factiva) to confirm 
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the fact of migration and its exact announcement date. We then imposed the following 
requirements: (1) The SE position at the DC becomes vacant due to natural causes. (2) 
The SE was in the employ of the OC for at least 3 years (to ensure that past performance 
measures are available for the emigrating SE) before emigrating and in the employ of the 
DC for at least 1½ years (to ensure that the same SE was occupying the new position in 
the DC when the OC took a write-off). (3) Both the OC and the DC are listed in major 
stock exchanges (to ensure availability of return data).14  
 
The sample includes cases in which the SE sells the OC to another company and 
then is hired by some DC. (Mergers and acquisitions can provide a good exit opportunity 
for the emigrating SE.) For this M&A subsample, we use the data for the pre-acquired 
OC.  Table 1 and Figure 3 summarize our sample.  
 
To construct the write-off sample,15 we reviewed the firms’ announcements for at 
least 1½ years after the immigration into the DC and extracted the date and content of the 
announcements (including the nature and amount of the write-offs). For both the OC and 
the DC, we view the first write-off following the migration event as possibly conveying 
some signal about the quality of the migrating SE. Because we focus on the DC’s stock 
price reaction to an OC’s write-off implicating the DC’s immigrating SE, we excluded 
seven write-off announcements that were made before the immigration event.16 
Table 1. Sample description 
 
Sample restrictions (1994-2002) 
Size of surviving 
sample 
Initial sample in EXECOMP 286 
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Migration among affiliates or holding titles in two firms excluded 256 
The SE immigrated into the DC more than 1 year after the 
emigration 
219 
Restriction on the DC—No confounding announcements at the 
immigration event 
185 
Employment requirements (3 years in the OC and 1½ in the DC 137 
Listed in the major stock exchanges, Final sample  116 
Breakdown of the migration by position change 
CFO or COO !  CEO 52 
CFO or COO !CFO or COO 47 
CEO !CFO or COO 2 
CEO !CEO 15 
 
<Insert Figure 3 Here> 
 
We searched the Dow Jones News Service (now Factiva) for the keywords “write-
off, write-down, or restructuring,” along with “charge.” In most cases, Dow Jones was 
the first to report the write-off announcement.  In a few cases, Business Wire or 
AP/Reuters/AFP had pre-empted Dow Jones by one or two days. We ensured that we 
included in the sample only the first announcement of the write-off and excluded 
announcements that provided at most more nuanced information about the pre-announced 
write-offs. Although it is conceivable that the subsequent minor details might have 
conveyed incremental information to the market, the effect likely would be secondary 
and not as pronounced as the effect of the first announcement.17 In the same vein, we 
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excluded write-offs that were reported in the press a second time, with descriptions of 
charges pursuant to a restructuring plan that was announced before the migration event. 
With respect to M&As, we include in the sample announcements by the acquiring firms 
of write-offs of the acquired (OC) firm’s assets. Among the final sample of 116 OC-DC 
paired migration events during 1994–2002, in 75 (90) cases, the OCs (DCs) took a write-
off within 1½ years. Below and in Figures 5 and 6, we report and discuss the relative 
frequency of write-offs in migration and non-migration firms.  
 
4.2. Construction of the control samples 
We constructed three sets of control samples for OCs and DCs, based on size and 
industry peers (see Figure 4). Control 1 comprises firms with the same two-digit 
historical SIC at the end of the year preceding the year of emigration or immigration.  
Among the peers (Control 1), firms with the same capitalization deciles as the sample are 
grouped as Control 2—size-matched, same-industry peers. Deciles of market 
capitalization are measured at the end of the year preceding the year of emigration or 
immigration. For some OCs and DCs, the number of firms in Control 2 could be very 
small. Control 3 comprises firms with a different SIC at the end of the year preceding 
migration. We construct this control group to provide an overall market (other than firms 
in the same SIC) benchmark for examining the reaction to the migration events and OCs’ 
write-offs.  
 
4.3. Description of the sample  
Figure 5 describes the sample. Compared to their industry peers (OC - Control 1), 
the OCs are larger (3-4 times more highly capitalized) and more profitable throughout 7 
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years (-3, +3).18 Compared to similarly sized firms within the same industry (OC - 
Control 2), OCs are more profitable, except in the emigration year (in terms of ROA, 
defined as EBIT/Average of Total Assets). In the long run, OCs grew in capitalization at 
a comparable rate to that of Control 2, but outperformed the control in accounting 
performance. Thus, generally, OCs are the larger and more profitable firms, and in the 
long run the OCs maintained their relative (more profitable) position vis-à-vis their peers, 
suggesting that larger and better performing firms are more frequently associated with 
management change.  
 
DCs are also larger (3–4 times more capitalized) and more profitable than their 
same industry peers (DC - Control 1). Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and 
ROCE (EBIT/Average Common Equity) of DCs are higher than those of DC - Control 1.  
DCs are smaller and less profitable than OCs. Overall, the immigration event has mixed 
effects. In the long run, the DCs’ accounting performance surpassed that of industry 
peers. After the immigration events, DCs’ ROEs and ROAs exceeded those of their 
similarly sized industry peers (DC – Control 2), but only because of lower denominators 
of these ratios (equity and assets, respectively), rather than improved EBIT.  
 
4.4. Is the incidence of write-offs higher in migration firms? 
 
We ask whether migration firms are associated with a higher incidence of income-
decreasing events such as write-offs, write-downs, and restructuring. CompuStat data 
item 17 (special items) potentially captures these events. Unfortunately, the number 
aggregates discretionary items (such as write-offs) and non-discretionary items (such as 
interest in tax settlements and Y2k charges). It also includes income-increasing items 
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(such as gain on extinguishment of debt and non-recurring profits from sale of assets).  
Hence, we identify discretionary income-decreasing activities by reviewing both the 10-
Qs or 10-Ks and the financial press; the financial press provides more timely information, 
but typically it does not furnish as much detail as the SEC filings.  We searched using the 
same keywords described above in the 10-Qs over 8 quarters following immigration and 
matched the findings with information gleaned from the financial press. In most cases, 
the two datasets are virtually identical.   
 
Figure 6 presents the analysis based on Compustat data #17. OCs and DCs report 
income-decreasing special items more frequently than the similarly sized firms (Control 
2) within their respective industries (59.5% versus 43.5% for the DCs, 56.9% versus 
48.6% for the OCs). These differences are statistically significant under the binomial 
distribution (1 if data #17 < 0, 0 otherwise). In terms of below-the-line reported items, 
migration firms exhibit frequencies similar to those of their similarly sized peers; that is, 
they appear to refrain from using below-the-line items to decrease reported earnings, 
possibly because analysts and investors ignore such items. On the other hand, industry 
peers of OCs record income-decreasing special items and below-the-line items more 
frequently than OCs.  
 
Because data #17 may include non-discretionary items and gains as mentioned 
above, the relatively higher frequency of negative special items in migration firms need 
not imply more frequent income-decreasing discretionary activities. To focus on 
discretionary items, we consider the Control 2 sample (similarly sized firms within the 
same 2-digit industries, 1,896 for OCs and 2,432 for DCs). For each OC and DC, within 
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one year before and after the migration event, we randomly select a firm out of the 
similarly sized peers until we identify the first firm for which the press reports a write-off 
announcement.19  Results of this analysis are reported in Table 3. A total of 72 of 116 
OCs and 90 of 116 DCs wrote off assets after the emigration and immigration 
respectively. It took 343 random draws from OC – Control 2 and 299 random draws from 
DC – Control 2 to identify 116 write-off announcements within one year from migration. 
 
The difference in frequency between migration firms and control firms is 
statistically significant under the binomial distribution, suggesting that migration firms 
take more numerous write-offs than their similarly sized peers, assuming that the 
observed frequencies for the random draws are representative of the frequencies for the 
whole sample. However, OCs do not take income-decreasing special items more 
frequently than industry peers (not restricted to similar size). This, combined with the 
observations that the accounting and stock performance of the industry peers is negative, 
suggests that OCs typically belong to declining industries. This result is generally in line 
with prior literature. Strong and Meyer (1987) found that the rate of outside management 
change among write-off firms (120 firms over 1983–1985) is higher than it is among the 
industry-matched similarly sized non-write-off firms (25% versus 1.6%). In our sample, 
the number of write-offs in migration and non-migration firms combined over 1994–2002 
is 351.  Without focusing on management change or migration, Elliott and Shaw (1988) 
identified 240 write-off announcements over the period 1981–1985. Bartov et al. (1998) 
documented 340 announcements over 1984 and 1985.20 The DCs in our sample took 
write-offs more frequently than their peers (whether or not size-adjusted). 
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V. Event Studies and Results of Univariate Tests  
 
In this section, we report on the market reactions associated with migration and 
write-off events of migration firms. Table 4a presents long-term, buy-and-hold, size- and 
industry-adjusted returns and size-adjusted short-window (-1,1) returns surrounding the 
announcements of emigration and immigration.  
 
5.1. Long-term pre- and post-migration stock returns 
 
The size- and industry-adjusted long-term stock returns of OCs over the year 
preceding SE emigration are positive, but insignificant. Returns over the two years 
preceding are below those of the size-matched and industry-matched peers, but not by 
much. After emigration, the size- and industry-adjusted long-term returns are highly 
positive and significant, at 13.68% over the first year and 13.92% over the second year 
after emigration. 
 
On the other hand, size- and industry-adjusted stock returns of DCs over the year 
preceding SE immigration are significantly negative. After immigration, however, DCs 
enjoy significant gains in the first and second year after the event (7.64% and 9.46% 
respectively). Overall, the migration of the SE appears to benefit both the OC and the DC 
significantly.   
 
5.2. Short-term reaction around migration 
Prior research has reported that the market reaction around a management 
departure is positive but insignificant (Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988). Hayes and 
Schaefer (1999) found that the market reaction to emigration (immigration) is -1.51% 
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(1.73%).21 We find that the emigration is associated with -0.98% size-adjusted average 
returns (p-value < 0.1%),22 implying a high perceived quality of the emigrating SE. Yet 
the announcement typically includes information about the replacement, thus 
complicating the effort to isolate the effect of emigration in light of the relative 
unobservability of the replacement’s quality. It is nonetheless unlikely that OCs replace 
their emigrating SEs with ones who have lesser quality. Hence, the inference that a 
negative reaction signals a relatively high perceived quality of the departing SE is 
plausible. The DC’s hiring announcement does not refer to the incoming SE’s 
predecessor, so the market reaction at the announcement is more clearly attributable to 
the SE’s immigration event. The short-term reaction to the immigration event is a 
significant (p-value < 1%) 1.56%.23  
 
It is instructive to compare the effects of migration events to those of retirement, 
i.e., normal succession events, which would not be expected to signal new information on 
average. We define normal succession events as those that occur when top SEs (CEOs or 
CFOs) announce retirement while naming a successor or stating an intention to stay until 
the position is filled. Previous literature (Pourciau, 1993; Vancil, 1987) viewed retirement 
announcements without named replacements as non-routine retirements. The event study 
results for our constructed retirement sample24 matched with OCs and DCs by industry 
and size reveal, as expected, that the market’s reaction at retirement is both economically 
and statistically insignificant (-0.31%, p-value = 0.61%) (See Table 4c). 
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5.3. The information transfer effect at the migration event 
Does the market reaction to the SE’s emigration inform the market’s 
interpretation and assessment of his immigration into the DC? Under the information 
transfer hypothesis, the market can learn about the quality of the immigrating SE in this 
way, suggesting that a high (low) quality of the emigrating SE should be associated with 
a positive (negative) reaction to the SE’s immigration. That is, we expect a negative 
correlation between Emigration(-1,1)OCCAAR and Immigration(-1,1)DCCAAR .  
We have shown above a negative stock reaction at emigration ( Emigration(-1,1)OCCAAR < 
0) and a positive reaction at immigration ( Immigration(-1,1)DCCAAR  > 0). As explained earlier, 
we expect a negative correlation between Emigration(-1,1)OCCAAR and Immigration(-1,1)DCCAAR . Table 
5 confirms this hypothesized negative correlation. The result is robust to using size-
adjusted returns, returns adjusted for similarly sized peers, and Fama and French 3-factor 
model adjusted returns (Fama and French, 1992). 
 
5.4. Reaction to the write-off announcement 
In the prior, more general literature, the market reaction to write-offs was found to 
be either insignificant (Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliott and Shaw, 1988) or negative 
(Bartov et al., 1998). Bartov et al (1998) found an average short-window reaction (using 
beta adjusted returns) to his sample of 373 write-offs of -0.75% (p-value = 9%). Focusing 
on the sample of migration firms, we show that, on average, the short-term market 
reaction to announced write-offs is -2.75% for OCs and DCs combined, -.2.81% for OCs, 
and -2.71% for DCs (p-value < 0.1%, See Table 6a).25 Compared to migration firms, 
when similarly sized industry peers26 under stable management announce a write-off 
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during a similar period (within a year of migration), the stock reaction is -1.34% and 
marginally significant. The reaction to the combined OCs and DCs’ write-off is different 
from the reaction to write-offs by their combined controls. (p-value = 5%) We suggest 
that the market may be skeptical regarding the success of a post-emigration restructuring 
plan announced by an OC in the absence of the qualified SE who emigrated, when there 
is uncertainty regarding the quality of his replacement. Similar uncertainties about the 
successful implementation of restructuring may cause the negative reaction to 
restructuring charges announced by DCs.  
 
5.5. The information transfer effect of the write-off 
Consider the following sets (see Figure 7): 
(A) DCs that hired OCs’ emigrants and that are industry peers of the OCs. 
(B) Industry peers of the DCs included in (A) above. These are also the industry peers 
of the OCs. 
(C) DCs that hired OCs’ emigrants and that are not industry peers of the OCs. 
(D) Industry peers of the DCs included in (C) above. 
(E) Industry peers of the OCs whose SEs immigrated into set (C). 
 
An OC’s write-off should carry no implications for firms in different industries and 
hence is expected to trigger no significant market reactions. If the write-off portends 
negative prospects for the industry to which the OC belongs, sets (B) and (E) should 
exhibit a negative reaction. However, we expect that the negative reaction could be 
attenuated, or even turn positive, to the extent that the market perceives some benefits 
inuring to the non-write-off peers from the adversity faced by the OC, such as gaining 
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market share at the OC’s expense. Another factor that likely influences the reaction of 
peers, set (B), is the destination of the emigrating SE. If the SE moved to an industry 
peer, the DC could be the primary or sole beneficiary of competitive gains. In this case, 
the competitive gains for set (B) will be minimal, if any.  
 
Relative to set (B), the market reaction to set (A) should reflect the SE migration 
effect. The net effect could be either negative or positive, depending on whether the 
market draws negative inferences from the OC’s write-off regarding the quality of the SE 
who moved to the DC, or positive inferences, if it perceived that a high-quality SE would 
enhance the competitive gains the DC may enjoy vis-à-vis the OC. These differing 
market perceptions will, in turn, depend on whether the write-off is part of a restructuring 
plan that reveals prior mismanagement by the emigrating SE or part of a “big bath” 
designed to boost the incoming SE’s future performance measures. 
 
Comparing set (C) with set (D) isolates the implication of the write-off for the 
perceived quality of the migrating SE. Since set (D) firms do not belong to the OC’s 
industry, no positive enhanced competitive advantage effect would be expected. Hence, 
the only effect potentially manifested in the difference between the two sets’ reactions 
would be attributable to the inference the market draws regarding the implications of the 
OC’s write-off for the SE’s quality. Separately, set (D) might have positive gains if the 
market assesses the quality of the SE negatively in light of the write-off.  
In Table 6b, we present the data on the information content of write-offs. Overall, the 
OCs’ write-offs have no significant effect on the DCs. However, DCs included in set (A) 
of 25 industry peers of the OCs gain positive and weakly significant abnormal returns of 
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2.40%.  The reaction of set (B) is a negative -0.27% (p-value< 0.1%), possibly because 
the write-off portends trouble for the industry when whatever competitive advantage 
could have resulted is appropriated by the DC.  The t-test of the difference in the means 
of the two sets’ reactions is significant (p-value< 0.1%). The sample of 50 DCs included 
in set (C) has a negative reaction of -1.74% (p-value<5%), highlighting, in the absence of 
competitive gains, the potentially negative implications of the write-off concerning the 
SE’s quality. Set (D) gains 0.26% abnormal returns (p-value < 0.1%), perhaps because of 
the DC’s own competitive disadvantage.  The t-test of the difference in the means of the 
reactions of sets (C) and (D) is significant (p-value < 0.1%). Set (E), receives 0.38% 
abnormal returns (p-value < 0.1%), reflecting the benefits inuring to the non-write-off 
peers.  
Table 6c reports the stock reaction to DCs’ write-offs.  Overall, OCs gain a positive 
abnormal return (0.81%, p-value < 10%), and the gain is larger (1.53%, p-value < 5%) 
when the OC sample is restricted to those that are industry peers of the DCs.  
 
VI. Results on the Main Hypotheses 
6.1. Results on H1 
We present OLS regression results using the Huber-White variance estimators in 
Table 7. α  and β1 represent the mean Immigration(!1,1)DCCAAR  of different and same-industry 
migration, respectively.  Assuming levels of accounting and stock performance that equal 
those of industry peers and assuming Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  to be zero, α  and β1 are 
insignificant (p-value >13% and 64% respectively), and the null test of α  = β1 cannot be 
rejected. That is, when past performance and Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  do not divulge anything 
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about the SE’s quality (do not differ for corresponding industry peers’ measures), the 
market does not react to the immigration event and to whether the OCs and DCs are 
members of the same industry.  
 
The remainder of Column 3 confirms the following: For SEs immigrating into 
DCs in different industries, neither the pre-emigration OCs’ accounting performance   (-
0.007, p-value = 0.45) nor the OCs’ past stock performance (0.000, p-value = 0.71) are 
associated with Immigration(!1,1)DCCAAR . As hypothesized in H1b, however, Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  is 
negatively associated with Immigration(!1,1)DCCAAR  (-0.418, p-value = 0.06). Thus it appears 
that when SEs move to non-industry DCs, the market focuses on the private information 
embedded in Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR   alone.  
 
On the other hand, for SEs moving to same-industry DCs, the market seems to 
rely more heavily on the OCs’ accounting performance (β2  + β3 = 0.4249 vs. β2 = −0.007, 
p-value = 0.09) and past stock performance (β4 + β5 = 0.198, vs. β4 = 0.000, p-value = 
0.08). As to Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR , even though its impact on DCs’ stock reaction at 
immigration is more negative (β6 + β7 = −0.848   vs. β6= -0.417 ),  it is insignificant (p-
value = 0.12), possibly because past performance becomes relatively more informative 
(on SEs’ quality) in this circumstance.  
 
In summary, the market seems to discount the public signals and rely on the 
private signals in the case of migrations to different industries. On the other hand, in 
same-industry migrations, the public signals are more informative than the private signals 
embedded in the reaction to emigration and hence trigger significant market reactions.   
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6.1.1. Robustness checks 
To check whether outliers and high-leverage observations drive the results, we 
employed several procedures. First, using a two-dimensional graph of outliers and 
leverage, we identified five points with high influence.  Regression excluding these 
points yielded similar results.  The residuals of the regression in H1 appear to follow a 
student t distribution rather than a normal distribution. Hence, we ran the tests using 
transformed dependent variable observations and confirmed qualitatively similar results. 
Second, we used alternate regression models: quantile regression-median least square 
regression, robust regression, and bootstrapping. In the robust regression, we ran an OLS 
regression and identified influential points, if any, with Cook’s distance. Then, excluding 
those points, we repeated the same procedure until no influential points were identified. 
The procedure also checked for heteroskedasticity in the residuals; if such were detected, 
we used the White estimator for variance to calculate the t-values.  The results were 
consistent with our OLS model.  
Theoretically, one suspects that because Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  impounds two public 
signals, past accounting and stock performance, multicollinearity might be a concern. 
However, a separate regression (not reported) of Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  on the two public 
signals reveals insignificant R2 and coefficients.  Nonetheless, we tested for 
multicollinearity with respect to each independent variable by computing VIF and 
condition number (Belsley et al., 1980).  All VIFs are under the common threshold of 10 
(all less than 3), and all condition numbers are less than 20.  
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6.2. Results of H2 tests (Table 8) 
The coefficient on the same industry membership indicator variable, α+β1, is -
0.029% (p-value = 3.2%), implying that OC write-offs have a negative implication for 
same-industry DCs. However, α+β1 + β2 (0.105 and p-value = 2.3%), which represents the 
mean effect of the occurrence of an OC’s write-off that is part of restructuring plan when 
the OC and the DC are in the same industry, is both positive and significant.  That is, for 
past performance measures and Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  that do not deviate from those of peers, 
even abstracting from the amount of the write-off, the market assesses favorably 
implications of an OC’s write-off that is part of restructuring.  (This is consistent with the 
univariate results in Table 6b, where we observe a positive market reaction to the DC’s 
stock upon the OC’s write-off.) 
 
Turning to past performance, accounting performance alone (different-industry 
migration, whether or not the write-off is part of a restructuring) has a negative but 
insignificant coefficient (β3 = -0.006, p- value = 50.5%). For same-industry migrations 
and non-restructuring write-off announcements by OCs, the past accounting performance 
alone is still negative and insignificant. In the case of same-industry migration and 
restructuring, however, past accounting performance is significantly negative (β3+β4+β5 = 
-0.145, p-value = 1.11%). Thus, the results support our hypothesis that past accounting 
performance has a negative association when the OC and the DC are in the same 
industry, and restructuring casts doubt on the quality of the SE. The past stock 
performance is not significantly associated with the DC’s market reaction irrespective of 
industry membership. On the other hand, the coefficient on Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  is positively 
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associated with the DC’s market reaction for different-industry migration, and more 
positive but insignificant for same-industry migration. This suggests that the DC 
investors who rely on the private signals embedded in Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  for the SE who 
migrates to a different industry reverse their beliefs about the SE’s quality. For a same-
industry migration, the association of Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  is insignificant.  
 
The DC’s market reaction is significantly increasing in the amount of the write-
off (0.281, p-value = 0.0%), possibly implying that the DC’s investors are pleasantly 
surprised that no restructuring took place, or that they perceive some competitive 
advantages to accrue to the benefit of the DC when both firms are in the same industry. In 
Column 4, we show the results of a regression that includes this variable. We are able to 
verify that the positive coefficient on amount is only significant in same-industry 
migrations. This latter regression, however, suffers from high multicollinearity. We 
discuss this issue further below.  
 
“Amount” has a negative but insignificant association (β11 + β13 = 0.08, p-value = 
77.1%) with the DC’s market reaction for different-industry migrations and write-offs 
that are part of restructuring. This could be because restructuring was expected or 
because no competitive gain or loss is expected across OCs and DCs in different 
industries. The DC’s market reaction is increasingly more negative (β11+β13+β14 = -1.482, 
p-value = 1.9%) in “amount” upon a restructuring in an OC in the same industry. In this 
case, the negative implication of a large restructuring for the SE’s quality seems to 
outweigh whatever competitive advantage might inure to the benefit of the DC. 
Additionally, although “unspecified amount” is insignificantly associated with the DC’s 
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market reaction in different-industry migrations, it has a negative, significant association 
in same-industry migrations (β15+β16 = -0.134, p-value = 0.00%).
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6.2.1. Robustness checks 
Multicollinearity presents some problems in the test of H2.  We check whether the 
multicollinearity affects the variance by calculating the variance inflation factor and 
condition number.  In our main regression, Column 3 of Table 8, the VIF and “condition 
number” are not high in conventional terms.28 But those cut-offs are arbitrary. A priori, 
we would have expected that there was no impact from stock performance and 
Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR , as the emigrating SE wields relatively less control over these measures. 
Thus we run regression (2) excluding those variables. The results are reported in Column 
2 of Table 8. Comparison of Columns 3 and 4 reveals that overall the coefficients 
remains similar.  
 
We also estimate a model that includes an interactive variable (Amount !  Same 
Industry) in order to investigate the positive association of “amount” in the case of non-
restructuring announcements. The results show that the amount is only significantly 
positive when the OC and the DC are in the same industry. In different-industry 
migrations, the coefficient on “amount” is still positive, but insignificant. It should be 
noted that the VIF of this regression is over 35. Thus the variance of error terms of the 
regression could be too high. On the other hand, the “condition number” is lower than the 
cut-off.  
 
The significance and pattern of the short-term returns do not change with the 
choice of models. We estimated the same regression for Hypotheses 1 and 2 using the 
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Fama and French 3-factor model (1992), 29  with similar results for accounting 
performance, which in same-industry migrations is negatively associated with both 
restructuring and non-restructuring announcements (H2 reported in Table 8, Panel b). We 
also performed tests using size-adjusted returns and market models, yielding identical 
patterns of results. 
 
Another concern is how we define membership in the same industry. We assumed 
that two companies are in a competing relationship if the two-digit SIC is identical. 
Although this approach is popular, new standards such as NAICS (North American 
Industrial Classification System) are replacing SIC. We tested the same hypotheses (H1 
and H2) identifying “same-industry” OCs and DCs with the four-digit NAICS30 and 
obtained similar results.  
 
The dependent variables in H1 and H2 and Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR  are measured over 3 
days surrounding an event (emigration, immigration, and the OC’s write-off). We tested 
the same hypothesis using a different window around the event, CAAR over 4 days (-
1,2). The results are qualitatively the same.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Our study focuses on SEs’ migration. Migration involves both emigration from 
the origin company (OC) and immigration into the destination company (DC). We 
examine whether the past accounting and stock performance of the OC are relevant to the 
market’s evaluation of the SE’s immigration event. The market’s reaction to emigration 
is presumed to reflect the private information of informed traders on the SE’s quality. 
Whether or not the SE immigrates into a DC that shares the same industry membership as 
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the OC seems to determine the value relevance of the two past performance measures. 
We confirm that the two measures are value relevant when the OCs and DCs are in the 
same industry.  When the SE moves to a different industry, the market seems to rely 
solely on the private signals embedded in the market reaction to the emigration.  
 
Write-offs by the OC closely following the SE’s departure can potentially inform 
the market about the SE’s quality. We find that the past accounting performance and 
“amount” of the write-off are negatively associated with the market reaction to the DC’s 
stock upon the OC’s write-off when the OC and DC are in the same industry and the 
write-off is part of a restructuring plan. Our results suggest that the market actively 
monitors a migrating SE’s past track record in reckoning the prospects of the DC. In the 
long run, however, both OCs and DCs appears to favorably maintain their accounting and 
stock performance relative to peers after the migration.  
 
 Two areas for future research come to mind. First, it would be useful to explore 
further the hiring of SEs by pre-IPO firms.  These firms are highly motivated to signal 
high potential to the IPO market. The ability to acquire an SE with an established record 
is a potent signal. An IPO’s success could well depend on the quality of an immigrating 
SE.  
 Second, we found a higher frequency of write-offs in recent years,31 and some 
write-off announcements have had a much higher impact on the capital market than 
others. In our study, we observed that write-offs of migration firms had a larger negative 
impact than those of non-migration firms. This implies that the market sees higher risk 
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associated with write-offs in migration firms. Does ex post performance validate the 
market’s singling out of these write-offs? 
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Figure 2. Timeline of management migration and subsequent write-offs 
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th 
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Figure 3. Summary of the data-gathering process 
 
 
Migration of Senior Executives 
CEO or CFO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Origin Company 
OC  
Destination Company 
DC 
Type of reasons (Cases b2 and c) 
• Resignation 
• Scout 
• M&A 
 
Requirements 
• Reason for Vacancy in DC 
o Natural cause  
o Predecessor is promoted to a higher-ranked position (typically, CEO-> 
chairman) 
o Position has been vacant for more than two years 
• Accounting and market data availability  
o CRSP and Compustat   
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Figure 4. Description of controls  
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Figure 5.  Descriptive statistics—Accounting and market performance measures for 
the origination company, its controls, the destination company, and its controls 
 
 
 
 
The year 0 is the fiscal year during which the top SE emigrates. 
 
Diluted EPS is CompuStat Data #57, EBIT = Pretax income (DATA #170) + Interest expense (DATA #15) – Interest 
income (DATA #62). 
ROE = EBIT/ Average Common equity (DATA #60) 
ROA = EBIT/ Average Total assets (DATA #6). 
Cash from operations is DATA #308 – DATA #124. 
Control 2 is the set of similar-sized industry peers (2-digit SIC). The size is calculated as the market capitalization as of 
the calendar year-end before the management migration. 
Control 1 is set of the industry peers (2-digit SIC). 
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Figure 5.  Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
 
\ 
 
 
 
For DC, the year 0 is the fiscal year during which the top SE immigrates. 
Diluted EPS is CompuStat data #57, EBIT = Pretax income (DATA #170) + Interest expense (DATA #15) – Interest 
income (DATA #62). 
ROE = EBIT/ Average Common equity (DATA #60). 
ROA = EBIT/ Average Total assets (DATA #6). 
Cash from operations is DATA #308 – DATA #124. 
Control 2 is the set of similar-sized industry peers (2-digit SIC). The size is calculated as the market capitalization as of 
the calendar year-end before the management migration. 
Control 1 is the set of industry peers (2-digit SIC). 
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Figure 6. Comparison of special items and below-the-line items in the management 
migration year 
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Figure 6. (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Our sample size is N=116. The set of similar-sized industry peers (Control 2) has a sample size of 2,532 for 
the OC and 3,726 for the DC. The set of industry peers (Control 1) has a sample size of 37,303 for the OC 
and 27,818 for DC. The set of non-peers (Control 3) has a sample size of  82,436 for the OC and 82,446 for 
the DC.  
 
In CompuStat, Special items — DATA #17  
Discontinued operation— DATA #66 
Extraordinary items—DATA #192 
Accounting change—DATA #183 
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Figure 7. Description of sets at OCs’ write-off—Information transfer 
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Table 3. Frequencies of write-off announcements in the financial press 
 
 Sample Similar-sized peers, Control 2 
OC 72/116 (62%) 116/343 (34%) 
DC 90/116 (78%) 116/299 (39%) 
 
 
There are 1,896 (for OC) and 2,432 (for DC) size-matched peers. We randomly selected a firm from these 
control samples until we found a firm with a write-off announcement within a year (before and after) of the 
write-off date of the corresponding OC or DC.  
 
Binomial T-test reveals that the mean percentage is significantly different between the sample and the 
control (t = -3.99, p <.001 for OC, t = -4.32, p<.001 for DC). 
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Table 4a. Size-adjusted return around the management migration  
 
Portfolio Size-adjusted return over days 
(-1,1) around SE emigration 
OC -0.98%*** 
Control 1 (N=17,944) 0.02% 
Control 3 (N=667,232) -0.06%*** 
 
Portfolio Size-adjusted return over days 
(-1,1) around SE immigration 
DC 1.56%*** 
Control 1 (N=24,896) -0.07%*** 
Control 3 (N=837,786) -0.08%*** 
 
Size-adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio return. 
 
 
Table 4b. Size- and industry-adjusted mean compounded abnormal return  
 
 Time OC  DC 
(-2,-1) -4.07% 4.62% 
(-1, 0) 1.78% -7.55%* 
( 0, 1) 13.68%* 7.64%* 
Relative year 
from SE 
migration 
( 1, 2) 13.92%* 9.46%* 
(-30, -2) -0.64% -0.55% 
( -1 ,  1) -1.00%** 1.63%** 
Relative day 
from SE 
migration (  2, 30) 2.40% -3.36% 
 
Emigration date for the OC is the date of the announcement of the departure; for the DC; it is the date of the 
hiring announcement.  
Control 1 comprises industry peers (2-digit SIC) and the same event date (immigration for the OC and 
emigration for the DC). 
Control 3 comprises different-industry firms and the same event date (immigration for the OC and 
emigration for the DC). 
Size- and industry-adjusted return = size-adjusted returnij  -   
1j
1
 
n
jn
k=
! size-adjusted returnk where size 
adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio return, k ! i, and nj is the number of firms in industry j.  
 
***  0.1% significance  
**  1% significance  
* 5% significance   
$ 10% significance 
 
In Table 4a, Patell’s (1976) standardized abnormal return test (Z-statistic) is used. 
In Table 4b, the t-test is used. 
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Table 4c. Comparison with retirement firms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emigration date for the OC is the date of the announcement of the departure; for the DC; it is the date of the 
hiring announcement.  
Control 1 comprises industry peers (2-digit SIC). 
Control 3 comprises different-industry firms. 
Size-adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio return. 
 
 
 
***  0.1% significance  
**  1% significance  
* 5% significance   
$ 10% significance 
Patell’s (1976) standardized abnormal return test (Z-statistic) is used for statistical significance. 
   Size adjusted returns 
 
Period 
Retirement 
(N=146) 
OC 
(N=116) 
DC 
(N=116) 
(-2, -1) -1.56% -12.35%*** -11.80%$ 
(-1,  0) -1.37% -17.03%*** -25.61%** 
( 0,  1) -11.29%** -6.51% -7.42% 
Relative 
year from 
SE change 
( 1,  2) 14.55%** -7.49% -7.77% 
(-30, -2) -0.92% -1.79%$ -0.63% 
( -1 ,  1) -0.31% -0.98%*** 1.56%*** 
Relative 
day from 
SE change (  2, 30) -0.74%$ 1.44% -3.12%* 
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Table 5. Correlation table   
 
 
 
Correlation  - Migration 
  Immigration(-1,1)
DC
CAAR  SameIndustry AcctperfOC StockperfOC  Emigration(-1,1)
OC
CAAR  
 Immigration(-1,1)
DC
CAAR  1     
SameIndustry 0.09 1    
AcctperfOC 0.10 -0.09 1   
StockperfOC 0.02 0.08 -0.01 1  
 Emigration(-1,1)
OC
CAAR  -0.30 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation  - OCs’ Write-off Event 
  OC W/O(-1,1)
DC
CAAR  SameIndustry AcctperfOC Amount Restructuring StockperfOC NoAmount 
 OC W/O(-1,1)
DC
CAAR  1       
SameIndustry 0.30 1      
AcctperfOC -0.47 -0.05 1     
Amount 0.21 0.19 -0.01 1    
Restructuring -0.07 0.16 -0.07 -0.22 1   
StockperfOC -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.09 1  
NoAmount -0.38 -0.24 0.14 -0.19 0.26 -0.05 1 
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Table 6a. The reaction to the write-off announcement by firm type 
 
Panel A. Stock reaction to the write-off announcement  
Size-adjusted return 
Day OC+DC (N=165) OC DC 
Size-matched 
peers without 
SE migration 
(N=186) 
(-30,-2) -0.61% -0.63% -1.05% -1.88%* 
(-1,1) -2.75%*** -2.81%*** -2.71%*** -1.34%$ 
(2,30) 2.94%* 5.05%$ 1.52%$ 0.05% 
 
Panel B. Stock reaction to the write-off announcement  
Residual of Fama and French 3-factor model  
Day OC+DC (N=165) OC DC 
Size-matched 
peers without 
SE migration 
(N=186) 
(-30,-2) -0.84% -0.51% -0.93% -1.91% 
(-1,1) -2.60%*** -2.99%*** -2.21%*** -1.17%$ 
(2,30) 3.36%$ 5.18%$ 1.92%  0.40% 
 
 
The write-off date for an OC or DC is the date of the first write-off after the SE’s immigration into the DC. 
The write-off date of the similarly sized industry peers (2-digit SIC) without SE migration occurs within the 
year that the OC or DC took a write-off.  
Size-adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio return. 
 
 
In B, the residuals from Fama and French 3-factor models are used to measure stock reaction.  
Ri - Rf = ai + bi [Rm - Rf] + si SML + hi HML+ εi . 
SML is a size factor—small minus large firm returns; HML is book-to-market factor—high minus low 
book-to-market firms returns. 
These are available on Prof. French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
 
The statistics are based on Patell’s (1976) standardized abnormal return test (Z-statistic). 
***: 0.1% significance  ** :1% significance  *:5% significance $ :10% significance 
 
 
 Write!off (!1,1)CAAR
 Difference H0: Difference is zero, p - value 
ΟC+DC vs. Control -1.41% 4% 
OC vs. Control -1.46% 2% 
DC vs. Control -1.37% 6% 
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Table 6b. Reactions to the write-off announcement by the OC  
Panel A. Write-offs announced by OCs (N=75), pooled across migration within the 
same industry and to a different industry (see Figure 7) 
 
Portfolio Size-adjusted return (-1,1) Portfolio  
Size-adjusted return 
(-1,1) 
OC -2.94%*** DC -0.33% 
Control 1 (N=18,242) 0.13% Control 1 (N=22,265) 0.00% 
Control 3 (N=657,222)  0.01% Control 1 (N=653,970)  0.02% 
 
Panel B. Write-offs announced by OCs that share industry memberships with the DCs 
(N=25) 
 
 Portfolio Size-adjusted return (-1,1) Portfolio 
Size-adjusted return  
(-1,1) 
OC -2.40%* DC – set (A) 2.39%$ 
Control 1 (N=7,138) 
- set (B) -0.27%*** 
Control 1 (N=7,138) 
- set (B) -0.27%*** 
 
 
Panel C. Write-offs announced by OCs that do not share industry memberships with 
the DCs (N=50) 
 
Portfolio Size-adjusted return  (-1,1) Portfolio 
Size-adjusted return  
(-1,1) 
OC -3.34%*** DC – set (C) -1.74%* 
Control 1 (N=11,104)  
– set (E)  0.38%*** 
Control 1 (N=15,127) 
– set (D) 0.26%*** 
 
 
Day 0 is the date of the first write-off by the OC after the SE migrated to the DC. 
Control 1 comprises industry peers (2-digit SIC). 
Control 3 comprises different-industry firms. 
Size-adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio return. 
 
For the description of sets (1)–(6), see Figure 7 and page 31. 
 
The statistics are based on Patell’s (1976) standardized abnormal return test (Z-statistic): 
*** : 0.1% significance  ** : 1% significance  * :5% significance $ : 10% significance 
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Table 6c. Reactions to the write-off announcement by the DC 
 
Panel A. Write-offs announced by DCs (N=90), pooled across migration within the 
same industry and to a different industry 
 
Portfolio Size-adjusted return (-1,1) Portfolio 
Size-adjusted return  
(-1,1) 
DC -1.92%** OC 0.81%$ 
Control 1 (N=25,844) -0.08% Control 1 (N=22,664) 0.21% 
Control 3 (N=841,877) -0.07%*** Control 3 (N=836,442) -0.06%*** 
 
Panel B. Write-offs announced by DCs that share industry memberships with the OCs 
(N=34) 
 
Portfolio Size-adjusted return  (-1,1) Portfolio 
Size-adjusted return  
(-1,1) 
DC -3.81%*** OC 1.53%* 
Control 1 (N=10,225) 0.28%** Control 1 (N=10,225) 0.28%** 
 
Panel C. Write-offs announced by DCs that do not share industry memberships with 
the OCs (N=56) 
 
Portfolio Size-adjusted return (-1,1) Portfolio 
Size-adjusted return 
(-1,1) 
DC -0.83% OC 0.33% 
Control 1 (N=15,619) -0.22% Control 1 (N=12,439) 0.15% 
 
 
 
Day 0 is the date of the first write-off by the DC after the SE immigrated into the DC.  
Control 1 comprises industry peers (2-digit SIC). 
Control 3 comprises different-industry firms. 
Size-adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio return. 
 
 
The statistics are based on Patell’s (1976) standardized abnormal return test (Z-statistic): 
*** : 0.1% significance  ** : 1% significance  * :5% significance $ : 10% significance 
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Table 7. Test of Hypothesis 1, N=116, where the abnormal returns are the size- and 
industry-adjusted returns 
Immigration(-1,1) 1 2 3
4 5
( 1,1)6 7 ( 1,1)
DC OC OC
OC OC
OCOC
Emigration Emigration
CAAR SameIndustry AcctPerf SameIndustry AcctPerf
StockPerf SameIndustry StockPerf
SameIndustry CAARCAAR
! " " "
" "
" "# #
= + + + $
+ + $
+ + $
 
 
 
Variable  Coefficients 
Intercept α 0.0132 (1.41) 
0.004 
(0.62) 
0.0136 
(1.53) 
SameIndustry β1 
0.0076 
(0.43) 
0.0239 
(1.36) 
-0.0060 
(-0.46) 
AcctPerfOC β2 
-0.0023 
(-0.03) 
 -0.0077 
(-0.75) 
SameIndustry !  
AcctPerfOC β3 
0.1665 
(0.71) 
 0.4319$ 
(1.78) 
OCStockPerf  β4 
0.000 
(3.47)*** 
 0.000 
(0.38) 
OCStockPerf !  
SameIndustry 
β5 
0.02634 
(1.49) 
 0.198$ 
(1.74) 
( 1,1)
OC
EmigrationCAAR !  β6 
 -0.2766 
(-1.51) 
-0.4175$ 
(-1.91) 
( 1,1)
OC
EmigrationCAAR
SameIndustry
!
"
 β7 
 -0.3721 
(-0.55) 
-0.4311 
(-0.73) 
R2  9.83% 8.52% 26.35% 
 
The t-statistic is based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-adjusted variance. 
Variables 
DC
Immigration(-1,1)CAAR
1 = The DC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns during the short window (-1,1) around 
immigration. 
SameIndustry is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the 2-digit SIC codes of the DC and the OC are the same, zero 
otherwise. 
AcctPerfOC = Industry-adjusted 2-year ROE, ROE = (EBIT1 + EBIT2)/ Average (Equity0, Equity2 ), where industry-
adjusted ROE = ROE – Average of ROE in the same (2-digit SIC) industry. 
StockPerfOC= The OC’s size and industry adjusted stock returns over the two years of the SE’s tenure preceding 
emigration. 
Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  = The OC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns during the short window (-1,1) around 
emigration.  
*** : 0.1% significance  ** : 1% significance  * : 5% significance $ : 10% significance
                                                
1 CAAR for firm i in 2 digit SIC digits j is the size- and industry-adjusted return, as follows. 
size-adjusted returnij  -   
1j
1
 
n
jn
k=
! size-adjusted returnk where size adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio 
return, k ! i, and nj is the number of firms in industry j.  
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Table 8. Test of Hypothesis 2, N=75, where the abnormal returns are the size- and 
industry-adjusted returns 
 
/ ( 1,1) 1 2
3 4
5
6 7
( 1,8
DC
OCW O
OC OC
OC
OC OC
Emigration
SameIndustry Restructuring SameIndustryCAAR
AcctPerf AcctPerf SameIndustry
AcctPerf SameIndustry Restructuring
StockPerf StockPerf SameIndustry
! " "
" "
"
" "
"
#
#
= + + $
+ + $
+ $ $
+ + $
+ 1) ( 1,1)9
10 11
12
13 14
OC OC
Emigration SameIndustryCAAR CAAR
Amount Amount Restructuring
Amount Restructuring SameIndustry
No amount No amount SameIndustry
"
" "
"
" "
#+ $
+ + $
+ $ $
+ # + # $
 
 
The t-statistic is based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-adjusted variance. 
Variables 
/ ( 1,1)
DC
OCW OCAAR !  = The DC’s size- and industry-adjusted stock returns over the short windows (-1,1) around OC’s 
write-off. 
SameIndustry is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the 2-digit SIC codes of the DC and the OC are the same, 0 
otherwise. 
AcctPerfOC = Industry-adjusted 2-year ROE, ROE = (EBIT1 + EBIT2)/ Average (Equity0, Equity2 ), where industry-
adjusted ROE = ROE – Average of ROE in the same (2-digit SIC) industry. 
StockPerfOC= The OC’s size and industry adjusted stock returns over the two years of the SE’s tenure preceding 
emigration. 
Restructuring = 1 if the OC’s charge is part of a restructuring plan, 0 otherwise. 
Amount = Charge/Total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
No-Amount = 1 if OC’s write-off does not specify the amount, 0 otherwise. 
 
In Panel A, stock returns / ( 1,1)DCOCW OCAAR ! , Stock perfOC, and 
 Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR – are measured in the following way. 
 
CAAR for firm i in 2 digit SIC digits j is the size- and industry-adjusted return, as follows. 
size-adjusted returnij  -   
1j
1
 
n
jn
k=
! size-adjusted returnk where size adjusted return = raw return – same-size portfolio 
return, k ! i, and nj is the number of firms in industry j.  
In Panel B, the residuals from Fama and French 3-factor models are used to measure / ( 1,1)DCOCW OCAAR ! , Stock perfOC, and 
( 1,1)
OC
EmigrationCAAR ! : 
Ri - Rf = ai + bi [Rm - Rf] + si SML + hi HML+ εi . 
SML is a size factor—small minus large firm returns; HML is book-to-market factor—high minus low 
book-to-market firms returns. 
These are available on Prof. French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
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Panel A. Regression (Model 3 is the main model)  
 OC W /O(!1,1)
DC
CAAR   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept α -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
SameIndustry β1 0.043 -0.003 -0.029* -0.025 -0.027* 
SameIndustry !  Restructuring β2  0.092* 0.134** 0.132* 0.127 
AcctPerfOC β3 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
AcctPerfOC!  SameIndustry β4 -0.076$ 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.006 
AcctPerf OC!  SameIndustry !Restructuring β5  -0.113* -0.140* -0.143$ -0.127* 
StockPerfOC β6 0.001  0.002 0.003 0.003 
StockPerfOC !  SameIndustry β7 -0.006  0.024 0.023 0.019 
 Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  β8 0.161  0.180$ 0.201 0.204$ 
 Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR !  SameIndustry β9 -0.327  0.218 0.205  
 Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  !  Restructuring β10     0.060 
Amount  β11 0.133 0.271** 0.281** 0.598 0.307** 
Amount !  SameIndustry β12 0.012   -0.334  
Amount !  Restructuring β13  -0.328 -0.369 -0.630 -0.405 
Amount !  SameIndustry !  Restructuring β14  -0.979 -1.396* -1.121 -1.342$ 
No-Amount β15 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 
No-Amount !  SameIndustry β16 -0.116** -0.138** -0.124** -0.126$ -0.124** 
Adjusted R2  13.62% 31.66% 29.95% 29.87% 29.69% 
Mean VIF  4.08 3.55 4.14 8.8 10.56 
Maximum VIF  14.91 6.81 9.95 35.6 45.43 
Conditional number  10.12 13.32 10.95 19.75 26.64 
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Panel A (continued). F- and t-tests (Model 3 is the main model)  
Test Group Detail Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Different-industry migration α 0 0 0 0 0 
Same-industry migration & Non-restructuring α+β1 0 0 -0.029* -0.027* -0.027** Mean effect 
Same-industry migration & Restructuring α+β1+β2  0.087* 0.105* 0.105* 0.101* 
Different-industry migration β3 0 0 0 0 0 
Same-industry migration & Non-restructuring β3+β4 -0.082$ 0 0 0 0 
Accounting 
performance - 
AcctperfOC Same-industry migration & Restructuring β3+β4+β5  -0.120* -0.146* -0.146* -0.139* 
Different-industry migration β6 0  0 0 0 Stock 
performance - 
StockPerfOC Same-industry migration β6+β7 0  0 0 0 
Different-industry migration β8 0  0.180$ 0.201$ 0.204$ 
Same-industry migration β8+β9 0  0.398 0   Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  
Restructuring β8+β10     0 
Non-restructuring β11 0.133* 0.271* 0.281* 0 0.307* 
Same-industry migration & Non-restructuring β11+β12 0   0.265*  
 Restructuring β11+β13  0 0 0 0 
Same-industry migration & Restructuring β11+β13+β14  0 -1.484**  -1.439** 
Amount 
Same-industry migration & Restructuring β11+β12+β13+β14    -1.486**  
Different-industry migration β15 0 0 0 0 0 No-Amount 
Same-industry migration β15+β16 -0.123*** -0.148*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** 
Amount vs. 
No-Amount 
Same-industry migration & Restructuring 
β15+β16=β11+β13
+β14   
Not 
Different Different Different Different 
 
The results of the tests are tabulated such that if the f or the t-test is not significant, “0” is recorded in the cell. For example, in the first row, α = 0 is tested, and 
the t-test statistic is not significant, so all the cells have zero. On the other hand, if the test statistics are significant (at 10%, 5%, 1% or 0.1%), then the actual 
coefficients (or the sums of the coefficients) are recorded. The significance is represented as follows:  
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*** 0.1% significance  ** 1% significance  *5% significance  $10% significance 
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Panel B. Comparison of the results of Model 3 using size- and industry-adjusted returns and the Fama & French 3-factor model   
A. Stock returns variables are Size and 
Industry adjusted returns 
B. Stock returns variables are abnormal 
returns from Fama and French’s 3 
factors Model Dependent variable : 
 OC W /O(!1,1)
DC
CAAR  
 Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Intercept α 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.05 
Same Industry β1 -0.029* -2.22* -0.014 -1.12 
SameIndustry !  Restructuring β2 0.134** 2.87** 0.115*** 2.65* 
AcctPerfOC β3 -0.006 -0.67 -0.004 -0.33 
AcctPerfOC !  SameIndustry β4 0.001 0.04 -0.057* -2.21* 
AcctPerfOC !  SameIndustry !  
Restructuring β5 -0.140* -2.23* -0.051 -1.20 
StockPerfOC β6 0.002 0.23 0.006 0.57 
StockPerfOC !  SameIndustry β7 0.024 1.02 -0.021 -0.98 
 Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  β8 0.180$ 1.78$ 0.253 1.38 
 Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  !  SameIndustry β9 0.218 0.45 -1.225$ -1.91$ 
Amount  β10 0.281*** 3.78*** 0.485*** 3.39 
Amount !  Restructuring β11 -0.369 -1.2 -0.612 -1.84$ 
Amount !  SameIndustry !  Restructuring β12 -1.396* -2.04* -1.415$ -1.41 
No-Amount β13 -0.010 -0.65 -0.017 -0.93 
No-Amount !  SameIndustry β14 -0.124*** -4.01*** -0.132*** -4.31*** 
Adjusted R2  29.95% 35.45% 
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Panel B (Continued) 
 
Test Group Detail A B 
Different-industry migration α 0 0 
Same-industry migration & Non-restructuring α+β1 -0.029* -0.014$ Mean effect 
Same-industry migration & Restructuring α+β1+β2 0.105* 0.101* 
Different-industry migration β3 0 0 
Same-industry migration & Non-restructuring β3+β4 0 -0.060* 
Accounting performance –  
AcctPerfOC  
Same-industry migration & Restructuring β3+β4+β5 -0.146*** -0.111* 
Different-industry migration β6 0 0 Stock performance –  
StockPerfOC Same-industry migration β6+β7 0 0 
Different-industry migration β8 0.180$ 0.253 
 Emigration(!1,1)
OC
CAAR  
Same-industry migration β8+β9 0 0 
Non-restructuring β11 0.281*** 0.485*** 
Same-industry migration & Non-restructuring β11+β12 0 0 Amount 
Same-industry migration & Restructuring β11+β13+β14 -1.484* -1.542$ 
Different-industry migration β15 0 0 No-Amount 
Same-industry migration β15+β16 -0.134*** -0.148*** 
Amount vs. No-Amount Same-industry migration & Restructuring β15+β16=β11+β13+β14 Different Not different 
 
 
The results of the tests are tabulated such that if the F or the t-test is not significant, “0” is recorded in the cell. For example, in the first row, α = 0 is tested, and 
the t-test statistic is not significant, so all the cells have zero. On the other hand, if the test statistics are significant (at 10%, 5%, 1%, or 0.1%), then the actual 
coefficients (or the sums of the coefficients) are recorded.  The significance is represented as follows:  
*** 0.1% significance  ** 1% significance  *5% significance  $10% significance 
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 For the period we examine, all SEs migrated to DCs of similar size as the OCs they 
emigrated from. 
2 The study defined distressed firms as those with default on debt, bankrupt firms, or 
firms privately restructuring debt to avoid bankruptcy. 
3 They include R&D, advertising expenses, capital expenditures, and accruals.  
4 Routine management change occurs when the CEO or CFO announce retirements and 
name a successor. 
5 These studies frequently discuss the migration event as a “raid.”  
6 In fact, unreported analysis indicates that Emigration(!1,1)OCCAAR is not significantly correlated 
with past performance measures (stock and/or accounting). 
7  Since a non-competing clause between the DC and the OC can dissipate such 
intangibles, four announcements referring to non-competing clause have been excluded 
from the DC sample.  
8 CAAR is measured as the size- and industry-adjusted return of firm i, size-adjusted 
returni -  1
n k=1
n
! size-adjusted returnk (where the group consists of firms in the same 2-digit 
SIC excluding firm i, and n = the total number of firms in the group). 
9 Results are qualitatively unchanged when using the ROE of the year preceding the 
emigration and the previous two years’ ROEs. 
10 For the M&A observations, the benchmark date is the month before the date on which 
the first rumor becomes available in the financial press. That is, Stock perfOC is measured 
over the period from two years and 33 days before the benchmark date to 32 days before 
the M&A announcement date. Motivating this measurement is the need to exclude from 
the calculated returns any potential market reaction to the M&A event.  
11 Restructuring announcements are those in which a firm mentions “restructuring,” 
“realignment,” or “reorganization,” and in which the write-off is presented as a direct 
consequence of such plans. 
12 We also included announcements that did not specify an estimate of the charge, but (as 
suggested above) the loading of this variable could absorb the loading on the 
restructuring dummy, β6. 
13 By natural causes, we mean previously scheduled succession (with the predecessor 
remaining in the same company after the SE’s immigration, often as the chairman of the 
board), creation of a new position, and filling of a position empty for more than 2 years, 
and death. 
14 We lost observations when an emigrating SE moved to a pre-IPO firm.  
15 Write-offs encompass both complete write-offs and write-downs, including those that 
form part of restructuring charges.  
16 Although these write-offs may have affected the reaction to the DCs’ stock upon 
immigration, the small number of these occurrences (7) should not affect the result 
materially. The results are qualitatively unchanged when these observations are included  
17 For example, on a specific date, Company A could announce a restructuring plan that 
spans 3 quarters, detailing future charges at the time. Then, in the subsequent 3 quarterly 
earnings announcements, the financial press would report the charges pursuant to the 
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previously announced restructuring plan. Only the first announcement would be 
informative; the three subsequent announcements would be devoid of content, unless the 
company happened to announce a change (such as an increase in the charges). 
18 Capitalization is measured as of the end of the year before migration.  
19 For example, suppose that there exist 100 similarly sized industry peers for an OC firm:  
i. Using the pseudo-random generator, we take one firm out of 100.  
ii. Then we search the news database to learn whether the randomly selected firm 
had a write-off announcement within a year (-1, +1) of the migration date,  
iii. If it took a write-off, the search is complete for the OC firm; otherwise, steps 1 
and 2 are repeated until we find a firm with a write-off announcement.  
20 Since both studies searched the whole universe in the news databases, a direct 
comparison with our sample is not meaningful. 
21 The authors separated the migration samples into CEO-to-CEO and non-CEO-to-CEO; 
DCs’ reaction to the former (latter) is 3.63%, N= 24 (1.06%, N=129).   However, they did 
not report the DC’s reaction for the pooled sample of CEO-to-CEO and non-CEO-to-
CEO.  
22 We use Patell's (1976) z-statistics for testing the significance of short windows’ stock 
reactions. 
23 The overall pattern of the short-term returns results is unchanged when we use different 
abnormal return measures, such as Fama and French’s (1992) 3- and 4-factor models and 
a market model. 
24 This sample comprises size-, industry- and time-matched firms that announce routine 
management change, and whose CEO or CFO announced retirement along with a named 
successor:    
i. In EXECOMP an initial sample with either CEO or CFO retirement status was 
gathered for 1994–2002 (n = 985). 
ii. In the initial sample, we matched the firms with the OC or DC’s three 
characteristics—capitalization decile, two-digit SIC code, and migration year 
(n=156).  
iii. Finally, we verified whether the retirement process of each firm was routine. The 
final sample contains observations.  
25 This reaction is robust to the choice of the model generating abnormal returns, so we 
simply present size-adjusted returns. 
26 We use the sample of non-migration similarly sized industry peers from Table 3 to 
compare the market reaction to the write-off. The number (N=186) that is included in 
measuring the stock reaction is slightly smaller because some of the size- and industry-
matched non-migration firms were the same for some OCs and DCs.  Such firms were 
separately considered for the purpose of comparing the incidence of write-offs, but 
included only once for the purpose of comparing the market reactions to the write-off. 
27 Again, the VIF measure and condition number for the multicollinearity were not high, 
all less than conventional cut-off points, even though the variables related to the content 
of the write-off by the OC are correlated.  
28 It is often suggested that a maximum VIF over 10, a mean VIF over 6, and a condition 
number over 20 are an indication of high variance due to multicollinearity.  
29 We ran this model with a calendar time regression of buy-and-hold returns.  
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30  According to the WRDS (Wharton research database) definition, NAICS is a 
hierarchical structure and can consist of up to six digits/levels. The first two digits of the 
structure designate the NAICS sectors, which represent general categories of economic 
activity. The third digit designates the subsector, the fourth digit designates the industry 
group, the fifth digit designates the NAICS industry, and the sixth digit designates the 
national industry. 
31 Elliott and Shaw (1988) identified 240 write-off announcements over the period 1981–
1985. Bartov et al. (1998) noted 340 announcements over 1984 and 1985. Within much 
smaller subsets, we have found 232 write-off announcements.   
 
